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COMMENT
GAMESMANSHIP ON THE CHECKERBOARD:
THE RECURRING PROBLEM OF ACCESS TO
INTERLOCKED PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LANDS
LOCATED WITHIN THE PACIFIC RAILROAD
LAND GRANTS
INTRODUCTION

"Let us, then, not despise the Plains; but turn their capacities to best account."'
In 1850 the United States stood astride North America
and was rapidly emerging as a major industrial power. In
the east the original thirteen colonies had been joined by
sixteen new states, carved out of the wilderness by legions
of settlers steadily pushing the edge of the frontier westward. In the west American claims to the Oregon Territory
had finally been settled, and California joined the Union as
the first state on the Pacific Ocean. However, between the
sleepy river towns of the Mississippi and the bustling gold
camps of the Sierra Nevada lay a vast, empty wilderness,
the Great American Desert. How to cross this forbidding
expanse and thereby link the settlements along the Pacific
coast with the rest of the country was hotly debated. The
idea of a transcontinental railroad was born and soon captured the imagination of a generation.2
During the 1860's the era of the great railroads arrived,
and three major land grants were authorized by Congress
in order "to aid in the construction of the [roads] by a gift
of lands along [the routes] . . . ."I The Union Pacific Land
Grant Act of 1862,1 the Northern Pacific Land Grant Act
of 1864' and the Atlantic and Pacific Land Grant Act of
Copyright@ 1982 by the University of Wyoming

1. Samuel Bowles, speaking in 1865 of the tremendous wealth which awaited
the coming of the rails to the western plains, quoted in R. ATHFAERN,
UNION PACIFIC COUNTRY 43 (1971).

2. In 1844 Asa Whitney proposed a plan to build a railroad stretching from
Milwaukee to the Puget Sound. He proposed to finance this venture by
petitioning Congress for the right to purchase a sixty mile wide swath
of public lands along the proposed route for sixteen cents an acre. See
P. GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLiC LAND LAw DEVELOPMENT 363 (1968).

3. Missouri, Kan. & Tex. Ry. Co. v. Kansas Pac. Ry. Co., 97 U.S. 491, 497
(1878).

4. 12 Stat. 489, amended by 13 Stat. 356.
5. 13 Stat. 365.
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18666 all conveyed liberal portions of the public domain 7 to
private corporations, so that the construction of the railroads might be financed by private capital generated by
land sales rather than by direct government subsidies.'
These land grants all incorporated a "checkerboard"
pattern, which entitled the railroads to claim alternate
sections of land lying within a certain distance of their rights
of way.' Within these "checkerboards" the granted lands
lay interlocked with retained lands. The effects of this
original division of the public domain are still felt today,
for despite over one hundred years of development the
"checkerboards" have shown a surprising ability to retain
this basic feature, interlocked lands held separately by a
variety of individuals, corporations and agencies."
The railroad land grants were part of a larger federal
policy of disposing public lands in order to foster their private development." While part of Congress' unparalleled
generosity was clearly inspired by outright graft and corruption," part was also due to the low estimation of value
which Congress placed upon such distant, undeveloped
6. 14 Stat. 292.
7. Land grants by the federal government to railroad corporations totalled
over ninety-four million acres. The Northern Pacific Railroad Land Grant
ultimately affected over forty-five million acres over a route which
stretched 2,128 miles. P. GATES, supra note 2, at 374, 385.
8. The construction of the transcontinental railroads required a commitment
of capital resources that was simply beyond the capacity of private enterprise without some form of assistance. "The amount is too vast; the enterprise too formidable; the returns too remote and uncertain." Statement of
Horace Greeley, quoted in R. ATHEARN, supra note 1, at 26. Since direct
subsidy of otherwise private enterprise was constitutionally suspect, the
scheme of land grants was used to allow public resources to bear the
primary burden of construction. See P. GATES, supra note 2, at 360-65.
9. The idea of granting alternate sections of public lands on either side of a
right of way was not new. It had been used previously to support the
development of public roads, river improvements and railroads. However,
it had never been implemented on such a grand scale. See P. GATES, supra
note 2, at 353-62.
10.

See WYOMING STATE PLANNING BOARD, UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD

LAND IN

WYOMING (1938). The map, attached to this volume, graphically illustrates
the capacity of the "checkerboard" to retain its original form over time.
11. The Homestead Act of 1862, 12 Stat. 392 (repealed 1976), was passed by
the same Congress that approved the original Union Pacific Land Grant
Act.
12. Credit Moblier of America was the construction company which largely
built the Union Pacific Railroad. It ultimately lent its name to a scandal
which touched the highest reaches of Congress as well as the Executive.
See R. ATHEARN, sulTa note 1, at 124-27.
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lands."8 Unfortunately in the haste to launch the engines
of progress across the mountains and plains, neither Congress nor the private parties responsible for financing, building and operating these great railroads anticipated the problem of acquiring access to the mutually landlocked sections
within the "checkerboards". At least no express provision
was ever made for such access.' 4
The federal government is no longer in the land disposal
business. In 1976 Congress declared that the public lands
were to be retained in federal ownership," completing a
change in federal policy in favor of the reservation and
withdrawal of public land resources which began in the late
nineteenth century.' 6 As the federal government assumed
its new responsibilities of managing the public lands rather
than merely disposing of them, the twin problems of private
access over public lands and public access over private lands
became recurring issues. The "checkerboard" lands presented an aspect of these problems that was unique only
because of its size.'
Two recent cases have had a significant impact upon
rights of access to "checkerboard" lands. Leo Sheep Co. v.
United States"s involved the issue of public access to lands
in Wyoming under the management of the Bureau of Land
Management (BLM). Montana Wilderness Association v.
United States Forest Service" presented the question of private rights of access across public lands in Montana being
administered as a Wilderness Study Area by the National
Forest Service. Together these decisions raise further issues
of fundamental public policy which must be addressed in
order to create a rational and intelligent basis for resource
allocation.
13. "The land itself, which this bill proposes to give away, is worth nothing
to the Government in its present condition. . . ." CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong.,
1st Sess. 2294 (1864) (statement of Rep. Donnelly).
14. See Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668, 678 (1979).
15. 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a) (1) (1976).
16. See General Revision Act of 1891, ch. 661, 26 Stat. 1103 (repealed 1976);
Organic Act of 1897, 16 U.S.C. §§ 473-481 (1976).
17. Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, supra note 14, at 678.
18. Supra note 14.
19. 655 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3695 (U. S. March
2, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Montana Wilderness Ass'n III.
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A BRIEF SURVEY OF THE "CHECKERBOARD"

The problem of access inherent in the "checkerboard"
land grants may be described with deceptive simplicity. Six
mile square townships were surveyed. These in turn were
subdivided into thirty-six sections, each encompassing a
square mile of land. The sections were numbered one to
thirty-six and the railroads were granted all odd-numbered
sections within a specified distance of the railroads' rights
of way. Each section conveyed was entirely surrounded by
other sections retained in federal ownership as public domain.
Likewise, each section retained was entirely surrounded by
sections conveyed. Technically one could not pass from one
public section to the next without committing a trespass on
some small part of the interlocked private lands, while the
reverse was true of anyone attempting to cross from one
private section to the next.
At the time of the grants, most of the land involved was
undeveloped forest and range which was used by the few
resident inhabitants as a common. The public lands were
open to all on an equal basis and, in the face of such an apparently limitless resource, open conflicts between users
were the exception rather than the rule. However, the coming of the railroad meant the coming of the surveyor. Soon
the land, which had been so empty, was criss-crossed with
markers, fence lines and claims, as a virtual flood of settlers
streamed onto the plains from the old eastern states and
Europe.2" Land was bought, sold, mortgaged and occasionally even given away. Since the private corporations which
were to build the transcontinental railroads depended almost
entirely upon the sale of their granted lands in order to
finance the immediate expenses of construction, they were
perhaps more aggressive in their efforts to sell their lands
20.

It was the land grants that persuaded capitalists to invest in securities of the railroads and enabled the railroads to advance far beyond
the zone of settlement, to be the true pioneers in opening up new areas
to growth. .

.

. The strenuous immigration promotion

campaigns

undertaken by the land grant railroads were felt all over Europe and
in the older states. The results are to be seen in the rapid settlement
of the West which, it had been earlier thought, would take one or two
centuries. By 1890 the Superintendent of the Census could say: "The
Frontier is gone."
P. GATES, aupra note 2, at 381.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol17/iss2/4

4

Powers, Jr.: Gamemanship on the Checkerboard: The Recurring Problem of Access

1982

COMMENT

433

than the government.2 ' This was particularly true in the
more arid regions of the west, such as Wyoming, where
much of the retained lands ultimately proved unsuitable for
homesteading and dry land agriculture.22
In places some private landowners, who had purchased
railroad lands, simply assumed de facto control over the
public lands interlocked with their private holdings.2 However, the efforts of these landowners to extend their control
over the public lands were not viewed with favor by either
the courts or the Congress in light of the greater federal
public policy of encouraging open settlement of the public
domain as well as other lawful uses of these public lands.
In Buford v. Houtz, 4 the Supreme Court adamantly
rejected the attempt of one group of landowners to enforce
an action in trespass against a stockman who was seeking
to graze his animals on interlocked public lands. The Court
expressed little sympathy for the landowners:
"[B]eing the owners of one-third of this entire
body of land [approximately 350,000 acres out of
some 921,000 acres actually involved] . . . they
propose by excluding the defendants to obtain a
monopoly of the whole tract, while two thirds of
it is public land belonging to the United States, in
which the right of all parties to use it for grazing
purposes... is equal." 2
The Court held that the defendants enjoyed an implied license
to use the unenclosed public lands for grazing. This license
grew "out of the custom of nearly a hundred years, that the
public lands of the United States . . . shall be free to the
people who seek to use them where they are left open and
unenclosed, and no act of government forbids this use."2 6
21.
22.

23.
24.
25.
26.

By 1968, only 15,840,077 acres remained in railroad ownership out of more
than ninety million acres originally granted. Id. at 384.
Much of the railroad land in Wyoming was allegedly offered for sale
at prices as low as 50 cents at a time when the public domain was
held at $1.25 an acre. This probably accounts for the success of the
railroad in selling vast areas of its land while the public domain sections in arid counties largely remain in public ownership.
WYOMING STATE PLANNING BOARD, supra note 10, at 11.
Id.
133 U.S. 320 (1890).
Id. at 325-26.
Id. at 326.
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Thus the landowners' title and the rights of ownership incident thereto did not create sufficient equity to allow them
to exploit the technical aspects of the "checkerboard" pattern in order to monopolize public rights in public lands.
Seven years later in Camfield v. United States" the
Supreme Court struck down another attempt to monopolize
public lands in the "checkerboard" by applying the Unlawful
Inclosures of Public Lands Act of 18858 in order to compel
the removal of the defendant's fences, which had illegally
inclosed over 20,000 acres of public land. The Court specifically rejected the defendant's contention that his property rights in the alternate sections which he had purchased
from the railroad allowed him to fence his lands as he saw
fit, even if that meant public lands would be inclosed as a
result.2 9 The Court said:
The defendants were bound to know that the sections they purchased of the railway company could
only be used by them in subordination to the right
of the Government to dispose of the alternate sections as it seemed best, regardless of any inconvenience or loss to them, and were bound to avoid
obstructing or embarrassingit in such disposition.
If practices of this kind were tolerated, it would
be but a step further to claim that the defendants,
by long acquiescence of the Government in their
appropriation of public lands, had acquired a title
to them against everyone except the Government,
and perhaps even against the Government itself."
Under this decision Congress could constitutionally regulate
activities on private lands, which threatened the government's right to determine the ultimate uses to which the
public domain might be put, "even though it may thereby
involve the exercise of what is ordinarily known as the police
power."'" If Congress had determined that the interlocked
27. 167 U.S. 518 (1897).
28.
29.
30.
31.

43 U.S.C. §§ 1061-1066 (1976).
Camfield v. United States, supra note 27, at 526.
Id. at 527 (emphasis added).
Id. at 525-26.
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public lands were to be held open for settlement, or by its
acquiescence had allowed the land to remain open for use by
the public as the government's licensee, then no private landowner would be allowed to exploit the accidental features of
the "checkerboard" land grants in order to deny the public
right of entry to and across such lands and thereby obtain a
valuable monopoly over any lawful use of such public lands.2
The twentieth century has seen a fundamental shift in
the public land policies of the federal government. Private
acquisition of the public domain under the various land laws
dwindled significantly. 3 Much of the land which remained
in the public domain was either too dry, too remote or too
poor to support homesteading or to attract a willing purchaser. The twin policies of withdrawal and reservation became the norm rather than the exception. 4 The relationship
between the federal government and the public lands grew
to resemble that of a proprietor in perpetuity as opposed to
that of a mere land agent. During this period of shifting
roles and policies the issues of public access across private
lands and private access across public lands continued to
arise. However, courts largely chose to side-step the issue
of whether there was an enforceable right to such access.15
Courts that did reach the issue split on the question of whether common law implied easements or easements by necessity should be allowed within the context of government
land grants.3
32. See also Mackay v. Uinta Dev. Co., 219 F. 116, 118 (8th Cir. 1914). "As
long as the present policy of the government continues, all persons as its
licensees have an equal right of use of the public domain, which cannot be
denied by interlocking lands held in private ownership."ld.
33. G. COGGINS & C. WILKINSON, FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES LAW
73 (1981). See Comment, Access to Public Lands Across Intervening Private Lands, 8 LAND & WATER L. REV. 149, 150 (1973).
34. See Exec. Order No. 6910 of Nov. 26, 1934; Exec. Order No. 6964 of Feb.
5, 1935.
35. See, e.g., United States v. Rindge, 208 F. 611 (S.D. Cal. 1913) (way of
necessity denied upon failure of government to show strict necessity);
Superior Oil Co. v. United States, 353 F.2d 34 (9th Cir. 1965) (implied
grant of way of necessity over public lands failed when viewed in light of
the purpose of the particular land grant) ; United States v. Dunn, 478 F.2d
443 (9th Cir. 1973) (vacating trial court determination that necessity did
not exist and remanding for determination of the permissible scope of any
such easement under the purposes of the original grant).
36. See Comment, Easements by Way of Necessity Across Federal Lands, 35
WASH. L. REV. 105, 112 and n.48-50 (1960).
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LEO SHEEP Co. V. UNITED STATES: AN EXCURSION INTO
THE NINETEENTH CENTURY IN SEARCH OF A
TWENTIETH CENTURY SOLUTION

A Clash of Interests
In 1973 the BLM bladed a road across "checkerboard"
lands in Wyoming in order to provide public access to a
fishing area located on public lands adjoining Seminoe Reservoir." The road crossed private land owned by the Leo
Sheep Co. at two points and the aggrieved landowner sued
to quiet title to these two pieces of land as against the BLM.88
However, the roots of this particular dispute extend somewhat further.
In 1965 Leo Sheep Co. had joined several of its neighbors and formed Elk Mountain Safari, Inc. This organization controlled over one third of a million acres, including
substantial lands within the "checkerboard," which had been
originally granted to the Union Pacific Railroad. It collected
user fees from individuals who wished to enter these lands
for hunting, fishing and other recreational activities, even
if these individuals simply wanted to cross over the private
lands in order to reach interlocked public lands." Thus
Elk Mountain Safari attempted to exploit its control over
private lands in order to condition access to public lands and
thereby gain a profitable monopoly over the lawful recreational use of a vast amount of public lands.
The BLM had received complaints about this practice,
which conditioned public use of a public resource upon payment of a private fee.4" The BLM's decision to open the
road in this case was aimed directly at this problem. Moreover, since the BLM asserted an existing right of access
either by implied reservation under the Union Pacific Land
Grant Act of 1862 or by an easement of necessity, the issue
of a public taking, which would require compensation to the
private landowner, arguably was not presented under these
37. Leo Sheep Co., supra note 14, at 678.
88. Id.

89. Note, Public Lands-Probleme in Acquiring Access to Public Lands Across
Intervening Private Lands, 15 LAND & WATER L. RmV. 119, 120-24 (1980).
40. Id.
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facts. Thus the private landowners were threatened with
the loss of their lucrative monopoly over the interlocked public lands.
The Supreme Court ultimately held that there was no
public right of access to interlocked public lands within the
"checkerboard". It rejected the BLM's claim of an implied
reservation as not being within the intent of Congress,4 and
refused to find a way of necessity under these circumstances
in particular or in favor of a sovereign entity in general. 4 '
In order to put this decision into perspective, a brief preliminary discussion of the common law doctrines which the
BLM relied upon will be necessary.
IMPLIED EASEMENTS AND EASEMENTS BY NECESSITY:
COMMON LAW SOLUTIONS TO THE

PROBLEM OF ACCESS

The doctrines of implied easement"3 and easement by
necessity" arose from a common heritage. Writers who
have considered the issues of public access over private lands
and of private access over public lands have generally included a discussion of these common law doctrines and their
potential as a solution to the problem of interlocked lands. 5
Although the consensus of these writers has favored the

application of common law principles to solve the problem
of access to interlocked federal, state and private lands,
courts have largely limited, qualified or otherwise refused
to enforce the full common law right in this context. A brief
examination of these related common law doctrines may help
41. Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, supra note 14, at 679.
42. Id. at 679-80.
43. "Implied easement. One which the law imposes by inferring the parties to
a transaction intended that result, although they did not express it....
One not expressed by [the] parties in writing but arises out of [the]
existence of certain facts implied from the transaction." BLACK'S LAW
DicrIONRY 458 (5th ed. 1979).
44.
Easement by necessity. Such arises by operation of law when land
conveyed is completely shut off from access to any road by land retained by the grantor or by land of grantor and that of a stranger.
Easement of necessity. One in which the easement is indispensable to
the enjoyment of the dominant estate.
Id. at 457.
45. See Simonton, Ways by Necessity, 25 COLUM. L. RLV. 571, 579-80 (1925);
Comment, supra note 36; Comment, supra note 33.
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identify the specific concerns which have shaped the opinions
of the various courts that have considered the issue.
Suppose S owned two contiguous lots, only one of which
enjoyed access to a public highway. If S conveyed the lot
without access to B, absent express terms to the contrary,
B could claim a right of way over the lot retained by S.
Likewise, if S conveyed the lot with access to B, even without
an express reservation a similar right of way would arise
in favor of S,so that he might use and enjoy the retained
lot. The common law rationale behind these results can be
traced to two fundamental principles of land use.
The common law sought to avoid results that would
impair the usefulness of land, for land was the foundation
upon which the wealth of the entire society was dependent.
One theory stated simply that "the law will not presume
that was the intention of the parties, that one should convey
land to the other in such a manner that the grantee could
derive no benefit from the conveyance; nor that he should
so convey a portion as to deprive himself of the enjoyment
of the remainder."4 The principle was applied first in cases
involving other express items of grant or reservation in
order to allow the claiming party to secure additional easements necessary to the enjoyment of the rights specifically
granted or reserved despite the absence of any language on
the point within the terms of the conveyance itself.47 In
order to avoid the patently undesirable result of leaving a
parcel of land without use or value, the courts looked beyond
the strict terms of the conveyance and examined all circumstances of the particular transaction to determine whether
some type of easement should be implied. The key concept
was that by enforcing the easement the courts were enabling
the parties to realize their true intent. Necessity for such
an easement could not by itself create an easement, but the
degree of necessity was widely accepted as relevant to the
issue of intent. 8 The terms of the conveyance would not be
46.

Collins v. Prentice, 15 Conn. 39 & 423 (1842), cited in Simonton, supra note
45, at 576 n.24.
47. Simonton, supra note 45, at 572-74.
48. Id. at 576; see also RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 476(e) & comments
(1944).
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read by courts to exclude such easements in the absence of
express language denying common law rights. However,
such terms were considered relevant evidence of particular
purposes that the parties had apparently intended to serve,
thus allowing courts to imply additional easements if necessary to serve such purposes.
A second theory of common law arose which was based
upon a general policy of law favoring the use and occupancy
of land: "[I]t is not only a private inconvenience, but it is
also to the prejudice of the public weal that land should lie
fresh and unoccupied." 49 This general social policy allowed
the courts to focus increasingly upon the issue of necessity,
whenever the issue of an implied easement to secure fundamental rights of access arose. Although some "judges concluded that the easement by necessity arose because of the
presumed intent of the parties,""0 in fact it was a separate
doctrine based upon a presumption that the parties to a
conveyance would not intentionally render otherwise valuable land unfit for either occupancy or use.5 Thus where a
party could show a) unity of title between his dominant
estate and the proposed servient estate, b) severance of this
title by means of a conveyance and c) the necessity for an
easement in order to secure a legally enforceable right of
access to his land, a way of necessity arose in his favor.
One issue that has repeatedly divided courts attempting
to apply these common law doctrines has been the degree of
necessity which must be shown before an enforceable right
to a particular easement can be established. Some courts
have applied a strict necessity standard,52 but this approach
has been criticized as the "product of 19th century juristic
thinking," which looked upon necessity solely as a means
of divining the parties' true but unspoken intent. 5 The idea
still retains some of its original vitality where a grantor
49. Simonton, supra note 45, at 574 n.11 (quoting Packer v. Welsted, 2 Sid.
39, 111 (1658)). See also 25 Am. Jun. 2d Easements and Licenses § 34
(1966).
50. Simonton, supra note 45, at 576.
51. Comment, supra note 36, at 107 and n.13.
52. United States v. Rindge, supra note 35; Alcorn v. Reading, 66 Utah 509,
243 P. 922 (1926), overruled by, Adamson v. Brockbank, 112 Utah 52, 185
P.2d 264 (1947).
53. Simonton, supra note 45, at 580.
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claims the benefit of a common law easement in derogation
of the express terms of his grant." However, increasing recognition of the social interest in the full utilization of land
and other resources has led other courts to favor a reasonable necessity standard which could be tailored upon occasion to meet the particular problems presented by any given
situation. This flexible approach has been applied widely. 5
A second issue which has divided the courts has been
whether common law easements by implication or necessity
should be recognized in the context of a land grant from a
sovereign entity, such as the federal government. Generally
there has been a pattern of judicial reluctance to extend the
principles of the common law to include situations involving
a sovereign entity as a party to the conveyance. Many land
grants from the federal government, including the railroad
land grants which created the problem of the "checkerboard",
involve specific legislation which must be interpreted according to the attendant legislative intent. Such grants are more
than mere conveyances; they are laws, and thus "the rules
of the common law must yield in this, as in all other cases,
to the legislative will."" Other courts have expressed their
fear that general application of the doctrine of easements by
necessity to situations where the only unity of title that could
be shown between the dominant and servient estates depended
upon tracing title back to when all land was held by the sovereign would result in a flood of litigation, since in theory
all land was once held by the sovereign. 7 Commentators
have criticized a blanket refusal to allow individuals to claim
common law rights of access against the sovereign,"8 and
some have expressed their belief that similar relief should
be available to the sovereign as well. 9
54. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 476(a) comment d, illustration 2 (1944).
55. Adamson v. Brockbank, supra note 52; Story v. Hefner, 540 P.2d 562
(Okla. 1975); Thisted v. Country Club Tower Corp., 146 Mont. 87, 405
P.2d 432 (1965).
56. Missouri, Kan. & Tex. Ry. Co. v. Kansas Pac. Ry. Co., supra note 3, at 497.
57. United States v. Rindge, supra note 35, at 619; Pearne v. Coal Creek
Mining & Mfg. Co. 90 Tenn. 619, 18 S.W. 402, 404 (1891).
58. Simonton, supra note 45, at 580; Comment, supra note 36, at 112-14.
59. Comment, supra note 36, at 115-17; Sax, Takings, Private Property and
Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 n.32 (1971).
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The following three cases all involve a similar issue
and illustrate some of the different rationales which courts
have used to determine whether to apply common law easements in order to allow a sovereign government, state or federal, to obtain access necessary for the use or development
of public lands. In United States v. Rindge, the court said
that it was "very doubtful whether the doctrine of implied
ways of necessity has any application to grants from the
government,"" ° but then determined the case upon the failure
of the government to establish strict necessity." In State v.
Black Brothers the court denied a state's claim to a common
law easement on two grounds: first, the court noted that
the state's sovereign power of eminent domain "would seem
to negative the strict necessity on which the reservation of
the right of way must be grounded," and second, that the
reservation claimed in this case otherwise failed for want
of a sufficiently detailed description of the particular right
being claimed.62 Finally in Herrin v. Sieben the Montana
Supreme Court noted the impossibility of passing across
public lands in the "checkerboard" without trespassing to
some extent upon private lands and held that "there [was]
an implied reservation by the federal government of a way
of necessity, not only in favor of the government itself...
but also in favor of the private citizens who wish to go upon
them for lawful purposes."6
The Leo Sheep Decision; A Resolution of Sorts.
When Leo Sheep finally reached the United States Supreme Court in 1979, the Court held that the essential and
controlling issue was whether Congress had "intended" to
reserve a public right of access across the private lands in
the "checkerboard". 64 In a unanimous opinion authored by
Justice Rehnquist, the Court noted first that no such reser60.
61.
62.
63.

United States v. Rindge, supra note 35, at 619.
Id. at 621-22.
116 Tex. 615, 297 S.W. 213, 219 (1927).
46 Mont. 226, 127 P. 323. 328 (1912), overruled by, Simonson v. McDonald,
131 Mont. 612, 311 P.2d 982, 986 (1957), in turn overruled by, Thisted v.
Country Club Tower Corp., supra note 55, at 440. While Herrin cannot be
cited as primary authority in view of the confused subsequent case history,
it nevertheless illustrates one possible solution to the problem of access.
64. Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, supra note 14, at 678-79, 681.
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vation existed under the express terms of the original land
grant legislation." Furthermore, the Court held that no
such reservation could be implied under the principles of the
common law, since the BLM could not demonstrate sufficient
necessity to warrant the enforcement of such an ill-defined
reservation." This conclusion was based upon two critical
determinations by the Court: access to serve a public recreation area was not the type of necessity that could support an
easement at common law, and the federal government's sovereign power to condemn any truly necessary right of way
eliminated the issue of necessity entirely.67 Finally, the
Court rejected the government's argument that its claim
to an implied easement was supported by either the common
law way of necessity doctrine" or the Unlawful Inclosure of
Public Lands Act of 1885.9 Unfortunately, although the
Court meticulously rejected each and every claim of the
government, it did not show the same care in its analysis.
Perhaps the Court's concern with history and its enthusiasm
for the "battles" of Picacho Pass and Glorieta Pass displaced
careful analysis of the "[a]dmittedly ...mundane's issue of

public access to public lands.7" A close reading of the analysis offered reveals several critical flaws.
1. The Standard of Necessity
The Leo Sheep Court clearly based its decision to deny
any implied easement on the failure of the government to
meet a strict necessity standard rather than the more flexible reasonable necessity standard. While application of a
strict standard might have been justified by the fact that
the government, as grantor, was apparently claiming an
implied reservation in derogation of the terms of the grant
legislation,71 the Court did not rely upon this premise in its
opinion. Instead, the Court noted that the original grant
had included several express reservations of certain lands
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. at 678-79.
Id. at 679-88.
Id. at 679-80.
Id. at 680-81.
Id. at 683-87.
Id. at 669-77.
See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
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within the "checkerboard", 2 and then revived a line of
cases, in which the Court had "refused to add to [these reservations] by divining some 'implicit' congressional intent.""
The government attempted to support its position by citing
the general rule that ambiguities in government grants
should be resolved in favor of the government. However, the
Court chose instead to adopt the position that a "quasi public" enterprise, such as the transcontinental railroads, stands
''upon a somewhat different footing from merely a private
grant, and should receive at the hands of a court a more
liberal construction in favor of the purposes for which it
was enacted." 74 Thus, almost without comment the Court
carved a huge exception out of the general rule that "[a]ll
grants [by act of Congress] are strictly construed against
the grantees; nothing passes but what is conveyed in clear
and explicit language; and as the rights here claimed are
derived entirely from the act of Congress, the donation
stands on the same footing of a grant by the public to a
private company."75
The case of Missouri, Kansas and Texas Railway Co. v.
Kansas Pacific Railway Co. 6 provided the foundation for
the Leo Sheep Court to examine the terms of the land grant
legislation so narrowly. It also provides a degree of perspective on the proper scope of the "quasi public" exception, that
the Leo Sheep Court apparently did not consider. In Missouri, Kansas and Texas Railway a private individual claimed title to certain railroad sections by right of preemption,
even though his actual entry upon the lands in question had
occurred after the enactment of the railroad's land grant.
He claimed that title to the granted lands could only be perfected by the railroad after a survey had located the actual
lands to be conveyed, since at common law a conveyance was
ineffective unless it contained a sufficient description of
72. Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, supa note 14, at 678 (citing 12 Stat. 492).
73. Id. at 679.
74. Id. at 683 (quoting United States v. Denver & Rio Grande Ry. Co., 150
U.S. 1, 14 (1893)).
75. Dubuque & Pac. R.R. Co. v. Litchfield, 64 U.S. (23 How.) 66, 88 (1859)
(emphasis in original). See also United States v. Union Pac. R.R. Co.,
353 U.S. 112 (1957); Andrus v. Charlestone Stone Prods. Co., 436 U.S.
604 (1978).
76. Supra note 3, at 497.
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the lands conveyed. Obviously the application of this common law rule of property would have raised havoc with the
railroad's ability to pass good and uncontested title to its
grantees, thereby crippling the land sale program which was
supposed to generate the necessary funds to build the railroad itself. Thus the Court held that Congress had intended
to pass title to the granted lands in praesenti in order to aid
the construction of the railroad and "[t]hat intent should
not be defeated by applying to the grant the rules of the
common law, which are properly applicable only to transfers
between private individuals."77
The problem with extending this exception to the Leo
Sheep situation is that the Court never identified any specific intent or purpose of Congress which would have been
threatened by the application of the common law to solve this
particular problem of access. The purpose of Congress in
making these grants was "to aid in the construction of [a]
road by a gift of lands along its route."7 Today the railroads have long since been built, the majority of granted
lands have passed by one means or another into the hands of
private individuals and apparently the primary purposes
of the grants have been fulfilled. While a similar exception
to the general rule of construction for federal land grants
has been applied in cases involving land grants to the states
for the support of public education, 9 the purpose of Congress in making these school grants was to provide a permanent trust fund to help meet the continuing expenses and
needs of providing public education. Absent such a continuing need, the courts should not hesitate to return to the
general rule of construction, insofar as a private "company,
in bargaining with the public, ought to take care to express
distinctly what payments they are to receive, and because
the public ought not to be charged unless it is clear that it
was so intended."8 Thus the strict necessity standard
77. Id. at 496-97. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
78. Missouri, Kan. & Tex. Ry. Co. v. Kansas Pac. Ry. Co., supra note 3, at 497.
79. Wyoming v. United States, 255 U.S. 489 (1921); Utah v. Andrus, 486
F. Supp. 995 (D. Utah 1979), appeal dismissed per stip., Nos. 79-2307 &
79-2308 (10th Cir. 1980).
80. Dubuque & Pac. R.R. Co. v. Litchfield, supra note 75, at 88 (citing Gildart
v. Gladstone, 1 East. 675).
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adopted in Leo Sheep imposes an unexpected and unjustifiable burden upon the public interest in securing the reasonable use of interlocked public lands.
2. Access for Recreation: A Question of Lawful Use As
Opposed to "Intended" Use
The Leo Sheep Court held that access to public lands
across private lands for recreational use could not be used
to support a claim of necessity, since such an intrusion on
the rights of private landowners could not have been intended or even contemplated by Congress at the time of the
original land grant."1 The Court appears to be saying that
implied easements can only be claimed to serve a use of the
land presently in existence at the time of the grant or conveyance. Rather than consider whether an implied easement might be necessary for any use of the retained public
lands in the "checkerboard", the Court began and ended its
inquiry by attempting to divine what specific uses the government and the railroads impliedly considered. The essential fallacy of this approach becomes patently obvious when
one considers that in 1862 the lands in question were largely
wilderness and had not been put to any use whatsoever. 2
Certainly a better rule in light of the general policy favoring
the full utilization of land would allow "the scope of the
easement by necessity [to] be such as to enable the dominant
owner to enjoy his land for all lawful purposes, so long as
the necessity continues."8 The problem of access is inherent
in the "checkerboard" pattern. No way of access exists to
reach the interlocked public lands for any purpose. The
physical realities of this situation, and not the proposed use,
creates the necessity. The Court lost sight of this essential
point when it chose to examine only the proposed use.
Furthermore, while admittedly" public recreation was
probably not even an issue in 1862, by 1973 outdoor recrea81. Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, supra note 14, at 679.
82. Simonton, supra note 45, at 583. Interestingly, the case of Higbee Fishing
Club v. Atlantic City Elec. Co., 78 N.J. Eq. 434, 79 A. 826 (1911), was
described by Simonton in 1925 as the only American case which had
adopted the rule that implied easements should be limited to uses in existence at the time of the original grant. Simonton, supra note 45, at 583
n.50.
83. Id. at 583.
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tion had become a major industry and Americans were turning to the public lands in unparalleled numbers. 4 The public interest in hunting and fishing on the public lands had
been expressly recognized by the Taylor Grazing Act,85 and
in 1976, three years before Leo Sheep was handed down,
Congress had declared that the public lands were to be managed to "provide for outdoor recreation" as well as the more
traditional uses, such as mineral development, timber and
grazing." Certainly Congress believed that recreation was
an appropriate and lawful use of the public lands, at least
in the modern context. However, since the use was not
"historic", the Court chose instead to ignore it almost without explanation.
3. Necessity and the Sovereign Right of Eminent Domain
The Leo Sheep Court also cited the federal government's power of eminent domain to demonstrate that an
implied easement simply was "not actually a matter of
necessity" under the facts of this case. 7 The Court en-

dorsed a general proposition that "eminent domain and easements by necessity are alternate ways to achieve the same result."88 However, a brief survey of the authority cited by
the Court in support of its conclusion reveals once again
that the issues involved are more complex than the Court
indicates.
The Court begins by considering the analogous power
of a private landowner to declare a private road across his
neighbor's lands by the authority of so-called private eminent domain statutes. 9 While some cases have held that
the enactment of such statutes abrogated common law
remedies entirely, 6 substantial authority has held that the
remedy of private eminent domain should be interpreted
in light of the overall public policy favoring land use to
expand, rather than limit, the ability of a landowner to
84. Comment, supra note 33, at 149.
85.

43 U.S.C. § 315 (1976).

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. § 1701(a) (1976).

Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, supra note 14, at 679-80.
Id. at 680.
E.g., WYo. STAT. §§ 24-9-101 to -104 (1977).
Simonson v. McDonald, eupra note 63; Alcorn v. Reading, supra note 52.
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secure access to landlocked lands." The Court's reliance on
Snell v. Ruppert 2 to support its position has been proven
premature. In 1980 the Wyoming Supreme Court recognized the continuing vitality of the common law way of
necessity doctrine as an alternative avenue of relief to the
private eminent domain statute for a properly situated
landowner. 3 Indeed, to hold that the statutory remedy
totally negates any issue of necessity under the common
law "would carry the doctrine of necessity far beyond that
announced in any ...

case and would destroy the principal

that where one grants property to another he thereby
grants him the reasonable and necessary means to enjoy
94
it, whether expressed or not.)
The Court's analysis then turned to the issue of whether
a sovereign government with inherent powers of eminent
domain should be barred from claiming rights of access
under the common law. The conclusion was a resounding
"yes." Two state court decisions were then cited for support
in lieu of any detailed analysis of either the issues or the
result." While the courts in both cases were clearly concerned with the potential difficulties that might follow a
decision to enforce a way of necessity "where the unity of
title on which [the easement] rests can be found only in
the sovereign, '"" the decisions were not based simply upon
the ability of a sovereign government to exercise powers
of eminent domain. 7 Moreover, the Leo Sheep Court never
stopped to consider whether eminent domain proceedings
91. Hellberg v. Coffen Sheep Co., 66 Wash. 2d 664, 404 P.2d 770, 773 (1965);
Horner v. Heersche, 202 Kan. 250, 447 P.2d 811, 817 (1968).
92. Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, supra note 14, at 680 (citing Snell v.
Ruppert, 541 P.2d 1042 (Wyo. 1975)).
93. McGuire v. McGuire, 608 P.2d 1278 (Wyo. 1980); Walton v. Dana, 609
P.2d 461 (Wyo. 1980). See generally Note, Property Law-Acquiring
Access to Private Landlocked Tracts: Wyoming's Statutory Right of Way,
16 LAND & WATER L. REv. 281, 288-89 (1981).
94. Adamson v. Brockbank, supra note 52, 185 P.2d at 273.
95. Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, supra note 14, at 680.
96. State v. Black Bros, supra note 62, 297 S.W. at 218; Pearne v. Coal Creek
Mining & Mfg. Co., supra note 57, 18 S.W. at 404. See also Bully Hill
Copper Mining and Smelting Co. v. Bruson, 4 Cal. App. 180, 87 P. 237
(1906).
97. State v. Black Bros. was based upon the failure of the state to "plead or
prove any right to a way of necessity" as well as upon the state's power
of eminent domain. 297 S.W. at 219. See supra note 62 and accompanying
text. Pearne v. Coal Creek Mining & Mfg. Co. did not involve a sovereign
entity; therefore, despite certain suggestive dicta, the issue of sovereign
rights under common law easement doctrines was not even before the court.
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actually provide a truly adequate remedy to the unique
problem of obtaining access to thousands of individual
sections of interlocked public lands throughout the west.
The willingness of the Leo Sheep Court to rely upon
the federal government's power of eminent domain to
obtain any "necessary" access to the public lands can also
be questioned if one accepts the Court's invitation to "recur
to the history of the times" in order to understand the
congressional intent behind a particular grant."5 A part of
any such historic review must include an examination of
the general state of the law as it existed at the time in
question. The exercise of eminent domain to condemn a
public right of way to serve federal proprietary lands
arguably would not have been possible in 1862.
The United States Constitution gives Congress authority over federal property in two separate clauses-the
Jurisdiction Clause"9 and the Property Clause. 10 These
clauses were initially interpreted to grant substantially different powers. Under the Jurisdiction Clause, Congress could
exercise full sovereign authority over the District of Columbia
and other federal enclaves to the extent that such authority
had been ceded or consented to by a particular state. 1 '
Under the Property Clause, the Congress could exercise
sovereign power to regulate the use of federal public lands
in the territories," 2 but upon the admission of a territory
as a sovereign state "all powers which properly appertain
to sovereignty, which have not been delegated to the federal
government, belong to the states and to the people."1 Title
98. Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, etpra note 14, at 669 (citing United States
v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 91 U.S. 72, 79 (1875)).
99. Congress shall have the power:
To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such
District . . . as may, by Cession of particular States, and the acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the United
States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the
Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be,
for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards and other
needful Buildings.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
100. "The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules
and Regulations respecting the Territory and other Property belonging to
the United States. .. ." U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
101. Fort Leavenworth R.R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525 (1885).
102. United States v. Gratoit, 89 U.S. (14 Pet.) 526 (1840).
103. Mayor of New Orleans v. United States, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 667, 737 (1836).
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to the public lands remained in the hands of the federal
government, 0 4 but, in the words of one commentator, the
United States held such lands "as a proprietor, and not as
a government," and therefore was only "entitled to the same
relief as any private landowner for waste committed against
federal property, both at law and in equity."1 Thus at the
time of the great railroad land grants the "property power"
of the federal government could hardly be considered the
True, the land
equivalent of full sovereign authority.'
granted to the railroads was largely located in the territories
and thus was subject to the full immediate authority of
Congress. But it cannot be doubted that Congress fully
believed that with the coming of the railroads statehood for
these territories would surely follow, forever altering the
relationship between the federal government and the retained lands.
The "property power" did not remain static over time.
During the last half of the nineteenth century the Supreme
Court recognized that the federal power over the public
lands in the various states had to be expanded to protect
the national interest in these lands. "A different rule would
place the public domain completely at the mercy of state
A later Court concluded "[t]he power over
legislation."'
the public lands thus entrusted to Congress is without limitations. 'And it is not for the courts to say how the trust
shall be administered.' .....
Finally, in 1976, the once accepted distinction between Congress's powers under the
Jurisdiction Clause and the Property Cluase all but disappeared when the Court wrote:
Congress exercises the powers both of a proprietor
and of a legislature over the public domain. Although the Property Clause does not authorize "an
exercise of a general control of public policy in a
state," it does permit "an exercise of the complete
104. Pollard v. Hagen, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845).
105. Engdahl, State and Federal Power over Federal Property, 18 ARIZ. L. REV.
283, 809 (1976).
106. Before the Civil War the United States did not use eminent domain to
acquire real property. Id. at 297 n.54.
107. Camfield v. United States, supra note 27, at 526.
108. United States v. San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 29 (1939) (quoting Light v.
United States, 220 U.S. 523, 537 (1910)).
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power which Congress has
109 over particular public
property entrusted to it.'
Thus, Congress's present authority to exercise the sovereign power of eminent domain to gain access to the public
lands entrusted to its management cannot be seriously
doubted. But when the same question is considered from
the perspective of the limited property power recognized
in the mid-nineteenth century, the Leo Sheep Court's belief
that a Congress sitting in 1862 would have felt that the
federal power of eminent domain was an "obvious [device]
for ameliorating disputes" over access lacks historic credibility.
4. Buford v. Houtz and Camfield v. United States: Distinguished, Dismissed and Dismembered by Leo Sheep
The federal government attempted to support its claim
to an implied easement or a way of necessity by citing a
line of earlier decisions, exemplified by Buford v. Houtz
and Camfield v. United States, which had upheld the right
of the general public to enter upon interlocked public lands
in the "checkerboard" in order to partake of the available
resources.11 The Leo Sheep Court distinguished and dismissed these cases as irrelevant to the issue at hand without
any indication of its reflection upon the fact that the private landowners in this case had found yet another way
to exploit the "checkerboard" pattern and create a vast
monopoly over a lawful use of the public lands for individual
profit. In Buford, and again in Camfield, private attempts
to stake out similar monolopies had been denied and condemned. In Leo Sheep, the practice received the highest
official sanction available today-approval by a unanimous
Supreme Court.
In Buford, the Supreme Court concluded that the public
enjoyed an "implied license" to use federal public lands
interlocked with private lands."' The particular use at
stake was the right to graze animals on open, unenclosed
public lands, which at the time was perhaps the only rec109. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 540 (1976)
110. See supra notes 24-32 and accompanying text.
111. Buford v. Houtz, supra note 24, at 326.
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ognized use of such lands. However, broadly read, the case
served notice that the claim of a private landowner to enjoy
the exclusive use of interlocked public lands would neither
be recognized nor enforced by the courts, where "under the
pretense of owning a small proportion of the land which is
the subject of controversy, [the landowner obtains] the
monopoly of this valuable privilege.""' 2 In Leo Sheep the
Court distinguished Buford on the grounds that grazing,
unlike recreation, was "a century old custom"... Imposing
such a limitation is nonsense, for in effect the Court would
be limiting the development of the public lands in the
"checkerboard" to a single, historic use, until and unless
the government has secured some right of access through
eminent domain or negotiation. Such a conclusion promises
only further problems for government agencies which have
been charged with multiple use management of the public
lands. The tradition of open grazing may have strengthened
the case for access in Buford, but it should not be used now
to deny similar rights of access for other lawful uses of
these lands.
In Camfield the Supreme Court rejected a constitutional challenge to the Unlawful Inclosure of Public Lands
Act, which allowed the government to enjoin and abate
fences and other forms of inclosures that prevented general
entry upon the public lands without claim or color of title
to such lands. The Court noted that the government "would
be recreant to its duties as trustee for the people of the
United States to permit any individual or private corporation to monopolize them for private gain ....""' The defendants argued that the government ought to bear the burden
of any inconvenience which resulted from its own "improvidence and carelessness" in granting the "checkerboard"
lands so that any system of fencing the interlocked private
lands would necessarily embrace some public land as well. 11
The Court quickly denied this claim as being "but an ill
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at 332.
Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 8upra note 14, at 687 n.24.
Camfield v. United States, supra note 27, at 524 (emphasis added).
Id. at 526. The defendants in Camfield had illegally fenced over 20,000
acres of public lands with a series of fences constructed solely on private
lands.
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return for the generosity of the Government in granting
[the railroads] half its lands to claim that it thereby incidentally granted them the benefit of the whole."'11 The
government's power to dispose of or use its retained lands
would not be obstructed, embarassed or denied by the craft
or wile of individuals who sought private benefit at public
expense.
In Leo Sheep, the Court dismissed the Unlawful Inclosure of Public Lands Act as an isolated "response to the
'range wars' " which plagued the American west during the
late nineteenth century, and held that Camfield simply did
not support a right of access to public lands." 7 However, at
least one other court realized quite early that the problem
of access was intimately related to the purposes of the
Unlawful Inclosure of Public Lands Act. In 1889 the Wyoming Supreme Court wrote as follows:
Is it the law or the fence which secures to the owner
of property its exclusive enjoyment? The fence is
made for beasts; the law is made for man.... The
fence destroyed, what greater facility of access
will the public then have than if the fence had remained? . . . When reduced to its last and true

analysis, the point in controversy is, shall the
United States have a way over the defendant's
land. "'
The essential issue in Camfield clearly involved the public's
right to cross legal property lines as well as illegal fence
lines in order to permit entry upon the public lands for
settlement or other lawful uses. Yet the Leo Sheep Court
simply refused to recognize the inherent connection between
the Act and the problem of public access. Thus, while a
fence can be removed for illegally inclosing public lands,
under Leo Sheep such lands remain locked behind property
lines without any assured right of access for any use.
The Impact of Leo Sheep
In conclusion, the Supreme Court justified its holding
in Leo Sheep by noting that "[g]enerations of land patents
116. Id.
117. Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, supra note 14, at 683-85.
118. United States v. Douglas-Willan Sartoris Co., 3 Wyo. 287, 22 P. 92, 97
(1889). See Comment, supra note 33, at 152-59.
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have issued without any express reservation of the right
now claimed by the government. Nor has a similar right
been asserted before.""' 9 The Court was "unwilling to upset
settled expectations to accommodate some ill-defined power
to construct public thoroughfares without compensation......
Ironically the simplistic approach of the Court introduced
new uncertainties concerning the rights of private landowners within the "checkerboard" to enjoy access to their
interlocked lands insofar as no mention of such rights
appears in any of the railroad land grant acts. If the common law could not be applied in favor of the sovereign,
could it be said with any certainty that it would be applied
to its detriment?
As alternatives to the common law easements denied
by this decision, the Court expressed its faith in the ability
of "negotiation, reciprocity considerations and the power of
eminent domain,' 21 as well as the "ordinary pressures of
'
to provide a solution
commercial and social intercourse,"122
to any reasonable problem of access. The faith is misplaced.
The power of eminent domain simply is inadaquate to the
task of securing access to public lands in the "checkerboard" simply because of the scale of the problem."' Reciprocity is a factor considered by the courts in determining
124
whether to enforce an implied easement at common law.
However, the Supreme Court's decision to deny public rights
of access to public lands in the "checkerboard" undercuts
potential private rights of access by destroying the legal
basis for enforceable reciprocal rights. Thus only negotiation
remains as a means of striking some accord between the
public and private interests. Both groups hold the power
to deny the other the use of its lands. However, such drastic
stategies ought to be avoided if the policy favoring the use
of land is to remain vital. Furthermore, although the government clearly "has, with respect to its own lands, the
rights of an ordinary proprietor, to maintain its possession
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

124.

Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, euepra note 14, at 687.
Id. at 687-88.
Id. at 681.
Id. at 686.
See supra notes 87-109 and accompanying text.
RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY

§ 476(f) & comments (1944).
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and prosecute trespassers,
any blanket action on the part
of the federal government to deny any access across public
lands would be sure to invite dispute, retaliation and charges
of unconstitutional takings.
MONTANA WILDERNESS ASSOCIATION V. UNITED STATES
FOREST SERVICE: A TWENTIETH CENTURY APPROACH
TO THE PROBLEM OF PRIVATE ACCESS

Leo Sheep left one question notably unanswered: could
a private landowner in the "checkerboard" claim either an
implied easement or a way of necessity against the government? In 1979, the issue arose in connection with certain
railroad lands which were interlocked with National Forest
lands in Montana. It was not until 1981 that the courts
finally settled the issue of access without any reference to
the common law whatsoever. In order to understand this
result, a brief summary of the underlying facts and the
several court opinions spawned by this case may be of some
assistance.
Private Access: Yet Another Clash of Interests
In 1979, Burlington Northern, Inc. applied to the
United States Forest Service for a permit to build a road
across National Forest lands in Montana. The road was
necessary to allow Burlington Northern to conduct timber
harvesting operations on a section of land which had originally been granted under the terms of the Northern Pacific
Land Grant Act of 1864. The permit was initially granted.
However, in 1977 the public lands surrounding this
section had been declared a Wilderness Study Area,"2 6 and
the prospect that such a road would impair the wilderness
characteristics of the entire area spurred the Montana
Wilderness Association (MWA) to seek declaratory and injunctive relief against the Forest Service and its decision
to grant this permit. The Forest Service then revoked the
permit and requested an opinion from the Attorney General
of the United States in order to resolve certain questions
125. Camfield v. United States, supra note 27, at 524.
126. Montana Wilderness Study Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-150, 91 Stat. 1243
(1977).
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about the rights of private individuals to claim access to
private lands surrounded entirely by public lands.
The Attorney General concluded inter alia that, although a common law easement by necessity could not arise
in the context of a grant of lands by the United States, "a
right to access may nonetheless be implied by reference to
particular grants."MIT Thus a grantee of public lands could

claim a right to "reasonable access across Government land
to use his property for the purposes for which the land
grant was made, if such an access right either expressly or
impliedly arises from the act authorizing the land grant." '
The Forest Service then reissued its permit to Burlington
Northern on the grounds that the railroad held an implied
right of access under the Northern Pacific Land Grant Act.
Construction of the access road soon began, and the MWA
once again sought judicial relief.
At trial, the court held in favor of the Forest Service
and Burlington Northern on the issue of access. Specifically,
it stated that Burlington Northern enjoyed a present right
of access to its "checkerboard" lands by implied grant
as well as by way of necessity." ' The private inholder's
position was distinguished from the position of the government in Leo Sheep, because such inholders could not claim
any right of eminent domain against the government in
order to secure necessary access to their lands.'
The MWA appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals, and on May 14, 1981 the court reversed the trial
127. Rights-of-Way Across National Forests, 43 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 26, at 20
(June 23, 1980).
128. Id. at 18.
129. Montana Wilderness Ass'n v. United States Forest Service, 496 F. Supp.
880, 885, 888 (D. Mont. 1980). The court found all three requirements of
the way of necessity doctrine satisfied in this case. There was original
unity of title in the United States; the title had been severed by a conveyance; and the easement was reasonably necessary to allow the grantee
to use and enjoy his land. The court also held that an implied grant of a
right of way existed on the strength of Leo Sheep's rule of liberal construction in the context of railroad land grants, together with the clear
and accepted congressional intent to allow the railroads to sell or otherwise
develop the granted lands. Id.
130. Id. at 884.
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court's decision." 1 The court held that in light of the Leo
Sheep decision, the trial court had been wrong to recognize
a private claim of access either by implication under the
railroad land grant legislation or by way of necessity." 2
The court was particularly concerned that if it upheld
the trial court on the issue of access, private landowners,
who had acquired title to sections which had been retained
originally by the government under the terms of the railroad land grants, would be subject to neighboring landowners' claims to common law rights of access across these
sections without enjoying any reciprocal rights themselves.
The court acknowledged Congress's purpose to further the
settlement and development of the western territories by
means of these grants, but held that "[i]f the congressional
purpose of settlement and development may be served without implied easements for the owners of even-numbered
sections, as Leo Sheep holds, it may also be served without
implied easements for the railroads and their successor
owners of odd-numbered sections."' 33 Congress did not intend in 1864 to create two classes of land within the "checkerboard" with vastly different rights regarding the issue
of mutual access, and this court was not about to do so in
1981. The court felt that Leo Sheep required it to turn its
back on the common law doctrines applied by the trial court.
Instead, it could only refer the parties to "the customary
process of negotiation", endorsed by Leo Sheep,"' thereby
leaving the question of relative rights of access to "checkerboard" lands to the vagaries of personal accommodation
rather than settled principles of law.
The Circuit Court also denied Burlington Northern's
claim to a right of access under the terms of the recently
enacted Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act
(ANILCA)."' Section 1323(a) of the act provides that:
131. Montana Wilderness Ass'n v. United States Forest Service, No. 80-3374
(9th Cir. May 14, 1981) [hereinafter cited as Montana Wilderness Ass'n I].
This opinion was originally published at 11 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L.
INST.Q 20521. However, it was later removed, when the court issued its
second opinion, dated August 19, 1981. See supra note 19.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Pub. L. No. 96-487, 94 STAT. 2371 (1980) [hereinafter cited as ANILCA].
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Notwithstanding any other provision of law, and
subject to such terms and conditions as the Secretary of Agriculture may prescribe, the Secretary
shall provide such access to nonfederally owned
land within the boundaries of the National Forest
System as the Secretary deems adequate to secure
the owner the reasonable use and enjoyment thereof: Provided, That such owner comply with rules
and regulations applicable to ingress and egress
to or from the National Forest System." 6
Burlington Northern asserted that, unlike any other provision of ANILCA, section 1323 applied nationwide to
provide a guarantee of access to its private inholdings
surrounded by National Forest lands in Montana. The only
problem with this argument was the simple fact that "the
term 'National Forest System' [was] not specifically defined in the Act."1 ' Thus in order to resolve this claim,
the court had to look beyond the terms of the Act itself and
consider the available legislative history.
The court ultimately concluded that section 1323 (a)
should be "limited in its application to the state of Alaska,"
and therefore was irrelevant to the present case."'5 First,
Title V of the Act was entitled "National Forest System"
and dealt solely with National Forest units located in
Alaska. Second, the court and the parties both agreed that
section 1323 (a) ought to be read in pari materia with section 1323 (b), which used similar language to provide rights
of access to nonfederal lands over "public lands" managed
by the Department of Interior under the terms of the
Federal Land Policy and Management Act. The term "public lands" was defined separately in ANILCA to include
only "lands situated in Alaska." ' 9 Third, the Senate Energy
136. Id. § 1323 (a). Subsection (b) uses essentially the same language to charge
the Secretary of Interior with the same responsibility to provide access to
nonfederally owned lands surrounded by "public lands managed by the
Secretary under the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976.
.." Id. § 1323(b).
137. Montana Wilderness Ass'n I, supra note 131, at 20522.
138. Id. at 20524.
139. ANILCA, supra note 135, § 102(3).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1982

29

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 17 [1982], Iss. 2, Art. 4

458

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XVII

Committee Report, 4 ' which contained a section by section
analysis of the Act, was not held to be conclusive on the
issue, for like the Act itself, the report used "indiscriminately terms defined in the Act as applying only to Alaskan
lands ... and terms not so defined . .. ""'. Fourth, despite
the fact that ANILCA had been one of the most hotly
debated issues to face Congress in years, there was a singular lack of comment on section 1323 and the question of its
proper scope.
The court concluded that while there was evidence of
a possible difference of interpretation within the legislative
record, such evidence was "not nearly sufficient to overcome
the actual language of the statute, which we believe is more
naturally read as applying only to Alaska."' 42 Finally, the
court held that nationwide application of section 1323 would
repeal by implication the provisions of the Wilderness Act
of 1964 dealing with access to private inholdings in wilderness areas and giving the government the option of exchanging lands to eliminate such inholdings."4 ' The court
felt that the scanty and inconclusive legislative history surrounding section 1323 simply did not demonstrate a clear
congressional intent to repeal the access provisions of the
earlier statute.'44 In short, the court categorically rejected
each and every legal basis offered by Burlington Northern
140. S. REP. No. 413, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 5070, 5254. The sectional analysis of section 1323 provides in
pertinent part:
This section is designed to remove the uncertainties surrounding
the status of the rights of the owners of non-Federal lands to gain
access to such lands across Federal lands. It has been the Committee's
understanding that such owners had the right of access to their lands
subject to reasonable regulation by either, the Secretary of Agriculture in the case of national forests, or by the Secretary of Interior in
the case of public lands managed by the Bureau of Land Management
under the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976. However,
a recent District Court decision in Utah (Utah -v. Andrus et al.,
C79-0037, October 1, 1979, D.C. Utah) has cast some doubt over the
status of these rights. Furthermore, the Attorney-General is currently
reviewing the issue because of differing interpretations of the law by
the Departments of Agriculture and Interior....
The Committee amendment is designed to resolve any lingering
legal questions by making it clear that non-Federal landowners have
a right of access. National Forest and public land, subject, of course,
to reasonable rules and regulations [sic].Id.
141. Montana Wilderness Ass'n 1, supra note 131, at 20523.
142. Id. at 20524.
143. 16 U.S.C. § 1134(a) (1976).
144. Montana Wilderness Ass'n I, supra note 131,.at 20524.
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to support its claim to an enforceable right of access under
ANILCA.
This decision did not stand, for a short three months
later the same panel of judges reconsidered their first
opinion and came to an entirely different conclusion on the
issue of the applicability of section 1323 to Burlington
Northern's access problems in Montana. This abrupt turnabout was mandated in the court's opinion by the discovery
of "subsequent legislative history," which had not been
argued at the earlier hearing. '
The opinion begins with a general rehash of the arguments discussed in the first decision. The court then turns
its attention to the Colorado Wilderness Act, which had
been passed by Congress three weeks after ANILCA.' 40
In the course of reconciling different House and Senate
versions of this Act, a conference committee chose to delete
a provision which provided access to nonfederal lands within
wilderness areas in Colorado. In the words of the conference
report, "[tihe conferees agreed to delete the section because
similar language has already passed Congress in Section
1323 of the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation
Act."' 47 The Circuit Court was particularly impressed with
the membership of this conference committee, noting the
presence of several individuals who could be charged with
"an intimate knowledge of the Alaska Lands Act. 148 Thus,
in the face of its own inability to come to grips with the
legislative history of section 1323, this court placed its
faith in the opinion of a handful of influential and informed
Congressmen. As a result, Burlington Northern's right of
access to its property could not now be denied.'49
This second opinion is also notable for the number of
issues which it specifically reserves. The proper scope of
section 1323 (b) is left undecided. However, given the parallel phrasing between this section and section 1323 (a),
145. Montana Wilderness Ase'n I1, supra note 19, at 957.
146. Pub. L. No. 96-560, 94 Stat. 3265 (1980).
147. Montana Wilderness Ass'n II, supra note 19, at 957 (quoting H.R. REP.
No. 1521, 96th Cong. 2d Sess. (1980).
148. Id.
149. Id.
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the two sections should probably still be read in pari
materia, despite the fact that the use of the defined term
"public lands" would arguably limit section 1323(b) to
Alaskan lands. Furthermore, the Senate Energy Committee's sectional analysis did not distinguish between the two
sections, but rather said that the entire provision was
"intended to resolve any lingering legal questions by making
it clear that non-Federal landowners have a right of access.
National Forests and public land, subject, of course, to
reasonable rules and regulations [sic] ...
15o
The court also reconsidered the effect that nationwide
application of section 1323 would have on the access provisions of the Wilderness Act. Instead of an implied repeal
of the earlier Act, the court now only saw "a facial problem
of tension" between the two statutes."' Since this case involved only wilderness study lands, the access provisions of
the Wilderness Act were not operative and thus the issue
of conflict between section 1323 of ANILCA and section
1134 (a) of the Wilderness Act was simply not raised by
the facts of this case.
Finally, the court totally withdrew its first conclusion
that Burlington Northern and other landowners within the
"checkerboard" could not claim relief under the doctrines
of implied grant and way of necessity. Access under section
1323 (a) was sufficient to dispose of the present case, and
that was as far as this court was prepared to go.' 52
Looking Behind the Words: A Subjective Inquiry Into the
Meaning of Montana Wilderness Association v. United
States Forest Service
The second Montana Wilderness opinion cites Leo Sheep
only once,'
a significant contrast to the first opinion.
There the court had held Leo Sheep to be controlling, rejecting any distinction between the government's right of
access to its retained lands in the "checkerboard" and the
private landowner's right of access to granted lands.'54
150.
151.
152.
153,
154.

S. REP. No. 413, supra note 140, at 5254.
Montana Wilderness Ass'n II, upra note 19, at 957 n.12.
Id. at 958 n.13.
Id. at 952 n.1.
Montana Wilderness Ass'n I, supra note 131, at 20524-20525.
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The reason for the difference between the first and second
Montana Wilderness decisions is quite simple. The second
opinion rests entirely upon an issue of statutory construction. By finding a right of access under the terms of
ANILCA, the court was able to avoid the sticky issues
raised by application of the common law after Leo Sheep.
In contrast, the first opinion had reached the question of
whether a common law easement should be implied to permit Burlington Northern to enjoy its property. The court
concluded that it was constrained by the Leo Sheep decision
to deny private landowners in the "checkerboard" the same
reasonable access that the Supreme Court had denied to the
government and the public.
The initial Montana Wilderness opinion marked an
abrupt break from the general policy of law favoring the
reasonable use of land. This policy had been one of the
basic premises behind the common law doctrines of implied
easements and easements by necessity, but the Leo Sheep
analysis apparently eliminated common law precedence, at
least in the context of the railroad land grants. Thus the
court was simply without a remedy for the needs of landowners within the "checkerboard", and instead could only
impose a stalemate where no one landowner could claim
access over the lands of his neighbors as a matter of right.
When the case returned for a rehearing, the court
seized upon section 1323 (a) of ANILCA in order to provide
a legal remedy despite the admitted confusion concerning
the intended scope of the statute. The court admitted that
"a subsequent conference report is not entitled to the great
weight given to subsequent legislation," but under the particular circumstances of this case, it felt that the conference
report on the Colorado Wilderness Act should tip the balance in favor of a broad, nationwide application of section
1323 (a) at least, so that Burlington Northern would not
suffer a total loss of any reasonable opportunity to use its
lands." ' Thus the court was able to avoid the Leo Sheep
trap this time, and thereby fashion a remedy within the
155. Montana Wilderness Ass'n II, supra note 19, at 957.
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principle that the law should not leave land without access
or a landowner without the use of his land.
The court may have had to stretch a bit in order to
extend section 1323(a) to solve an access problem in Montana.' Certainly the decision to apply section 1323(a)
nationwide will effect "a major change in current law," ''
one that will have a tremendous impact upon relations between the federal government and local landowners. As
explained below, public rights in public lands may bear
the burden.
First, the authority of the Secretary of Agriculture,
and arguably of the Secretary of the Interior as well,1"8
to manage wilderness study areas has certainly been weakened. The government's authority to pursue a policy of land
exchanges under section 1134(a) of the Wilderness Act is
now open to question.' In the future, whenever Congress
designates an area for wilderness study, nonfederal inholders will be able to enforce their access rights under
section 1323(a) and possibly subsection (b) as well, even
though such roads and other attendant activities of these
landowners may destroy the wilderness characteristics of
a much broader area of federal lands. Thus, a handful of
individuals may be able to exploit their position as inholders
to frustrate, either intentionally or otherwise, important
policies of federal land management.
Secondly, by eliminating any remaining discretion of
the Secretary of Agriculture concerning the question of
access to nonfederal lands surrounded by federal lands,
the section leaves the government without a basis upon
156. The decision in Montana Wilderness Ass'n lHwas extremely close, despite
the apparent unanimity of the panel. The court's efforts to distinguish the
two subsections of section 1323, the retreat from the prior holding that an
owner of nonfederal lands in the "checkerboard" could not claim an implied grant of access against the government or its successors, and the
unwillingness of the court to address the admitted tension between section
1323 applied nationwide and important provisions of the Wilderness Act
of 1964, all bespeak a court that, while perhaps not entirely satisfied with
all parts of its decision, nevertheless was willing to accept the result in
order to avoid a legal stalemate.
157. Montana Wilderness Ass'n 1, supra note 131, at 20524.
158. See supra notes 136 & 150 and accompanying text.
159. Similar issues may also arise concerning the Secretary of Interior's often
challenged authority to regulate uses of lands located in Wilderness Study
Areas committed to his care under section 603(c) of the Federal Land
Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. § 1781 (c) (1976).
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which to negotiate with private landowners for public access.
The effect on public access issues in the "checkerboard" will
be particularly hard insofar as negotiation was just about
the only method of obtaining public access, short of full
blown eminent domain proceedings, surviving the aftermath
of Leo Sheep. If private landowners enjoy a right of access
to their lands, what can the government offer in negotiation?
THE FUTURE OF AccEss IN THE "CHECKERBOARD"

The issue of access within the "checkerboard" will continue to arise in several situations. How well do the Leo
Sheep and Montana Wilderness Association decisions contribute to the resolution of those issues?
First, extensive portions of the "checkerboard" have
passed entirely into private hands by this time. Roughly
half of the land traces title to the railroad land grants,
while the other half passed either under one of the other
land acts or by purchase from the government. In the first
Montana Wilderness Association case, the court explicitly
noted the potential problems that would result from creating
two classes of land within the "checkerboard", one favored
with common law rights of access and the other lacking
them. 6 ' Although private eminent domain statutes will probably provide a sufficiently secure right of access in the
majority of cases, there remains the possibility that the
owner of an original railroad section could claim an implied
right of access under the terms of one of the railroad land
grants. The Attorney General acknowledged that such claims
might be enforceable against the government; they may be
equally enforceable against the government's grantees. The
second Montana Wilderness Association opinion carefully
avoided the issue. If the common law arguably provides a
cost effective means of obtaining access which otherwise
would be conditioned on the payment of compensation, eventually someone will put it to the test.'
160. See aupra notes 132-34 and accompanying text.
161. See Adamson v. Brockbank, saupra note 52, 185 P.2d at 274.
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Secondly, future courts will have to consider whether
Leo Sheep represents a general denial of common law rights
of access to the federal government for all purposes, or
whether it actually represents a fairly special case which
should be largely limited to its facts. The BLM may have
injured its case by deciding to open the road first and seek
a judicial determination of its rights later, after it had
already "invaded" the property rights of the private landowner. The decision may also be limited to the issue of
access for recreational purposes, leaving the issue of access
by the federal government to fulfill its management duties
to be decided in another case. However, the analysis lends
itself well to a broad denial of access rights, especially in
light of the Court's repeated references to the extensive federal powers of eminent domain.'
A third type of case involving access to "checkerboard"
lands may also arise concerning the development of school
land grant sections interlocked with federal public lands as
well as private lands. Under Montana Wilderness Association such sections clearly enjoy a statutory right of access
over surrounding National Forest lands, and probably over
BLM lands as well. Moreover, these sections also can claim
an implied grant of access to fulfill the purposes for which
the school land grants were originally made. 6 ' However,
under Leo Sheep the state could not claim access over private lands under the common law since the state is a sovereign entity with the power of eminent domain. Thus, the
state's ability to develop its school sections and thereby fulfill the primary purpose of these grants may be severely
compromised.
CONCLUSION

In Leo Sheep, the Supreme Court adopted a simplistic
solution to a very difficult problem. By concentrating upon
the imperfectly recorded intent of a Congress which sat
162. Such a distinction may conflict with the BLM's responsibilities under the
Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, which does not distinguish between recreational uses of the public lands and other more traditional uses. See 43 U.S.C. § 1701 (1976).
163. See Utah v. Andrus, supra note 79.
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more than one hundred years ago, the Court was able to
dismiss the entire issue of public access to public lands for
recreation and possibly other purposes as not being within
the cognizance of that Congress, and no one today can conclusively say that it was not so. In choosing this easier
route, the Court failed to entirely consider the effects of
time and attendant changes of circumstances upon the
duties and responsibilities of the federal government as a
landowner. Instead the Court has left the federal agencies
which must manage these lands with only the narrow option
of pursuing an action in eminent domain in order to insure
that the public lands truly remain public. Access is a fundamental property right. Land without access is land without value. The Court's excessive reliance on eminent domain
will certainly make it more difficult for the BLM and the
National Forest Service to manage their "checkerboard"
lands. Public use of these lands will certainly be curtailed,
for "[r]equiring compensation when a conflict among competing users is resolved in favor of diffuse-interest holders
[such as the public], and not when it is resolved against
them, inevitably skews the political resolution of conflicts
16
over resource use and discriminates against public rights.' '
In Montana Wilderness Association, the court narrowly
avoided a legal stalemate which would have left Burlington
Northern without any means to secure reasonable access to
its interlocked lands. While the court may have reserved
too many questions by choosing to base its decision solely
upon its interpretation of a single statute, at least it recognized and avoided the sterile logic of Leo Sheep. The
opinion may not have fully discussed the public interest in
preserving a potential wilderness area nor fully considered
the impact of Burlington Northern's road upon the proposed uses of the surrounding federal lands, but at least
the court found a legal remedy to one aspect of the overall
problem of access within the "checkerboard".
Burlington Northern was fortunate to uncover enough
additional information to document, at least to the satisfac164. Sax, 8upra note 59, at 160.
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tion of one court, a congressional intent to guarantee adequate access to nonfederal inholdings. Private landowners
in the "checkerboard" can now rest assured of reasonable
access to their interlocked lands after years of litigation,
legislation and confusion. Unfortunately, the public cannot
claim a similar right to use or enjoy the public lands in the
"checkerboard" without running afoul of the traditional
taking doctrine, requiring a commitment of resources and
a volume of litigation that would tax the mightiest of federal agencies.
GEORGE E. POWERS, JR.
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